The Feds Don't Knock Anymore
The groundwork for a state judge's arrest was laid by decades of law enforcement federalization and state sovereignty violations.
The arrest of Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Hannah Dugan by the FBI last week has set off a predictable firestorm across the political landscape. What remains less examined, however, are the quiet federalism fractures it exposes. Beneath the surface hysteria lies a slow, grinding erosion of the decentralized architecture that once undergirded American democracy.
In a country now deeply reliant on federal authority, it is unsurprising that the Trump administration would move swiftly against a state judge who appeared to obstruct the deportation of an undocumented immigrant with a criminal record. Federal power no longer rests solely on the clear supremacy of constitutional law; it leans heavily on the implied threat that the machinery of enforcement will activate against those who resist. States, once proud laboratories of self-government, are now often treated as administrative provinces—expected to comply swiftly with Washington’s dictates. That an executive branch—under any president—would believe it could criminally prosecute a sitting state judge over a contested policy matter is less a testament to Trump’s brazenness than it is to the imbalance baked into the modern federal relationship.
Trump’s authoritarian tendencies deserve scrutiny. But the gravity of Judge Dugan’s alleged actions should not be lost in the broader narrative. Critics eager to frame the arrest as simply another Trumpian assault on norms must confront an uncomfortable truth: if the facts are as reported—that Dugan knowingly facilitated the evasion of lawful federal custody—then her behavior raises its own constitutional and political alarms. A judge does not possess a roving veto over the law. Evading lawful federal process, even an administrative one, threatens the integrity of the judiciary and undermines the rule of law itself. Pretending otherwise invites a selective, ends-justify-the-means approach to legal authority that no serious democracy can long endure.
The deeper story here, though, concerns the cumulative consequences of decades of federalization. Authority has increasingly flowed upward—first in matters of defense, then commerce, and now domestic law enforcement—weakening the structural role of states in balancing national power. Federal criminal law has expanded far beyond its original scope, drawing the federal government into arenas traditionally reserved for state jurisdiction. The normalization of federal law enforcement’s domestic presence, particularly after the post-9/11 security expansions, blurred the practical limits of federal intervention. Agencies like the FBI, DEA, and ICE have evolved from specialized bodies into sprawling domestic forces, often operating independently of local law enforcement and answerable primarily to the executive branch. Their access to national surveillance networks, the widespread use of administrative subpoenas without judicial oversight, and expansive interpretations of federal jurisdiction have allowed them to operate deep within the internal affairs of states.
Where once federal involvement was exceptional, it has become routine. Local incidents that would historically have been handled by state or municipal authorities now attract federal interest and intervention. This shift has been reinforced not only by federal law but also by the incentives tied to federal grants and asset forfeiture programs, which make local jurisdictions financially reliant on federal partnerships. State resistance, once a meaningful check, has been systematically eroded by these dependencies, as well as by a judiciary increasingly deferential to federal supremacy. Immigration enforcement itself, long treated as a civil administrative function, has been increasingly criminalized and nationalized, further tightening Washington's grip.
It is in this context that federal agents moving against a sitting state judge feels less like a dramatic rupture and more like the inevitable outcome of a long drift. The basic expectation that a state judge could resolve a local matter without federal interference has been quietly undermined. Instead, the reach of federal law enforcement now extends into courtrooms, council chambers, and even local police stations, with little public reflection on what has been lost in the process.
State sovereignty remains critical to the function of American democracy. It was intended not as an ornamental feature of the constitutional system, but as a working safeguard against centralized authority. State governments were envisioned not merely as administrative units but as active participants in shaping the nation’s political and legal fabric. Yet political discussion today almost exclusively distills power into the presidency, Congress, and the federal courts, leaving little room to imagine state governments as independent centers of political life. Even many who now voice alarm over Judge Dugan's arrest speak in a vocabulary that presupposes a federal solution to every problem, further entrenching the centralization they claim to oppose.
Immigration policy—the backdrop to this case—offers a vivid example. Federal law rightly sets broad standards for who may enter and remain in the country. But how those laws are enforced, particularly in civil matters, could reflect the diversity of local governance. In a healthier system, states would exercise greater discretion over whether and how to cooperate with federal immigration authorities. One jurisdiction might prioritize public safety differently from another; one might view community trust as paramount, another might emphasize strict enforcement. Instead, uniformity is treated as an unquestioned virtue, even when it grates against local preferences and the spirit of federalism. The space for democratic variation narrows, replaced by a rigid conformity that leaves little room for the practical wisdom of local governance.
The reality that a federal law enforcement agency can so readily intervene in a state courthouse to effect an arrest—and that this act barely registers as extraordinary—suggests just how much ground has been ceded. That this power is accepted across much of the political spectrum reveals the extent to which the federal government has become the default locus of both grievance and remedy. Some will defend the necessity of a strong federal response; others will decry the heavy-handedness of this particular administration. Few, though, seem willing to grapple with the larger truth: American democracy was never meant to operate under a single, consolidated power. It was designed as a balancing act—a constant negotiation between the local and the national—that preserved space for the former to thrive independently of the latter.
The risks seen in this story—of federal retaliation, of weakened judicial independence, of political escalation—are not new phenomena born of a single administration. They are the culmination of a steady reorientation of American governance, one that has crowded out the role of the states and, with it, one of the essential checks on centralized power. As the vocabulary of political life becomes ever more nationalized, the quiet but essential role of state sovereignty continues to erode, leaving American democracy increasingly brittle and vulnerable to the very kinds of excesses this case so starkly reveals.
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