The interests of left-technocrats and right-populists will converge to undermine choice and pluralism by federalizing more policy, all in the name of the people.
This is a well-argued piece. But the current polarization is better understood as a rift between partisan identities, not ideologies. Most people, and especially committed partisans, have incoherent positions on the “issues,” and coalitions form mainly around keeping the evil bastards in the other party out at all costs. I think that nuance explains some of the statistics you cited better than “depolarization” does — voters do view their own party less and less favorably, but statistics show they also dislike the other party more than ever.
It’s true that ideological variation exists within both parties, and policy priorities often align. But policy conversations happen almost entirely within parties and not between them. In DC, most congresspeople simply give up on making any legislation when their party is out of power. Voters don’t punish politicians for not trying to get policy done; their main priority is preventing other politicians from taking the reins.
I’m also skeptical that two sub-coalitions in opposite parties tend to unite to pass more centralized and heavy-handed policies. Marijuana legalization has seen some actually successful alliances of the type you describe, while many of the potential policies you listed are on the back burner.
Last thing — there’s robust evidence that polarization does indeed have a snowball effect. Just plug “political polarization self reinforcement” into Google Scholar. So it’s not a fallacy to treat polarization as something that, all else equal, will increase in the near term.
Evan, thank you for reading and for the comment! You're referring to the affective polarization including where people's political views are more motivated by opposition to the other side. I think that's clearly real but in my reading even this form of polarization had not impeded major consolidations of federal power during the late Gilded Age into the Progressive Era where far reaching policies that undermined federalism still passed despite the polarization and culture warring of the time. So, this may be a matter of degree or other factors at play. And it may well be that the polarization seems more severe now than than it did a century ago because of the stakes and expectations that have been placed in the federal government since then. While we haven't yet seen many examples of left and right policy nationalist collaborating, I posit that that is what comes next.
This is a well-argued piece. But the current polarization is better understood as a rift between partisan identities, not ideologies. Most people, and especially committed partisans, have incoherent positions on the “issues,” and coalitions form mainly around keeping the evil bastards in the other party out at all costs. I think that nuance explains some of the statistics you cited better than “depolarization” does — voters do view their own party less and less favorably, but statistics show they also dislike the other party more than ever.
It’s true that ideological variation exists within both parties, and policy priorities often align. But policy conversations happen almost entirely within parties and not between them. In DC, most congresspeople simply give up on making any legislation when their party is out of power. Voters don’t punish politicians for not trying to get policy done; their main priority is preventing other politicians from taking the reins.
I’m also skeptical that two sub-coalitions in opposite parties tend to unite to pass more centralized and heavy-handed policies. Marijuana legalization has seen some actually successful alliances of the type you describe, while many of the potential policies you listed are on the back burner.
Last thing — there’s robust evidence that polarization does indeed have a snowball effect. Just plug “political polarization self reinforcement” into Google Scholar. So it’s not a fallacy to treat polarization as something that, all else equal, will increase in the near term.
Evan, thank you for reading and for the comment! You're referring to the affective polarization including where people's political views are more motivated by opposition to the other side. I think that's clearly real but in my reading even this form of polarization had not impeded major consolidations of federal power during the late Gilded Age into the Progressive Era where far reaching policies that undermined federalism still passed despite the polarization and culture warring of the time. So, this may be a matter of degree or other factors at play. And it may well be that the polarization seems more severe now than than it did a century ago because of the stakes and expectations that have been placed in the federal government since then. While we haven't yet seen many examples of left and right policy nationalist collaborating, I posit that that is what comes next.